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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Edward Smith appeals the order of the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
granting summary judgment against him on his due process 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and on his state law 
defamation and right of privacy claims.  Smith also appeals 
the District Court’s judgment as a matter of law on his claim 
for punitive damages arising from a § 1983 retaliation claim 
that Smith prevailed on at trial.  Finally, Smith appeals the 
District Court’s partial denial of his motion for attorney’s fees 
and costs.  For the following reasons, we will vacate and 






 A. Factual History1 
 
 On May 20, 2005, Joseph Loftus, borough manager for 
the Borough of Dunmore in Pennsylvania (“Dunmore” or the 
“Borough”), asked Chief Vince Arnone of the Dunmore Fire 
Department to provide a list of required qualifications for 
full-time firefighters and to verify whether each Dunmore 
firefighter met those qualifications.  Upon review of the 
information provided by Chief Arnone, Loftus concluded that 
Smith, who was a fire captain at the time, had not completed 
a required two-week Fire Academy training course.  Loftus 
reported that conclusion to Dunmore’s Borough Council, 
which made the decision to suspend Smith with pay until it 
could hold a hearing to address the apparent deficiency.2    
 
                                              
1 Because we are reviewing the District Court’s grants 
of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, we 
set forth the facts in the light most favorable to Smith. 
2 The Council also made the decision to suspend 
Robert Dee, another Dunmore firefighter who, like Smith, 
had not completed the Fire Academy training course.  
Councilman Joseph Talutto explained the decision to suspend 
the firefighters immediately (rather than waiting until after 
the hearing), stating that they “ha[d] a duty to protect the 
town” and “didn’t want it to go out there that we had firemen 
that weren’t qualified” and “d[id]n’t want to get blasted in the 
paper.”  (App. at  608, 612.) 
3 
 
 On June 28, 2005, Loftus sent Chief Arnone a letter 
notifying him that Smith was suspended with pay pending a 
July 6, 2005 hearing.  Two days later, a local newspaper 
published an article stating that Smith had been suspended for 
failing to complete the Fire Academy training.  As the source 
of its information, the article cited Loftus’s letter to Chief 
Arnone, which had been provided to the paper by a 
confidential source whose identity remains unknown.3   
 
 On July 6, 2005, a hearing was held before the 
Borough Council in which it was determined that, pursuant to 
the firefighter union’s collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”), Smith, who had been a full-time firefighter since 
1988, was not required to complete the Fire Academy training 
because his training and experience were treated as sufficient.  
Smith was reinstated after having been suspended for eight 
days but without having suffered any loss of pay or seniority.   
 
As a result of his suspension and the publicizing of 
that suspension in the local paper, Smith filed suit against 
Dunmore on July 5, 2005, claiming defamation, due process 
violations, right of privacy violations, and retaliation.  After 
filing suit, Smith had a conversation with Leonard Verrastro, 
a member of the Borough Council, in which Verrastro stated 
that, because of Smith’s suit, he would vote against 
                                              
3 While the precise identity of the source remains in 
question, the District Court’s opinion appears to assume that 
the pool of possible sources is limited to the members of the 
Borough Council.  Neither party contests that view and, in 
fact, both seem to share it.  We will likewise accept that 
conclusion for purposes of our analysis. 
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permitting Smith to retire early, despite a pension board 
recommendation that early retirement should be allowed.  As 
a result, Smith amended his complaint to include a second 
claim for retaliation.4   
 
 B. Procedural History 
 
As amended, Smith’s complaint named Dunmore, the 
Borough Council, Loftus, and five individual council 
members as defendants.  It contained six claims: (1) a due 
process claim based on his pre-hearing suspension; (2) a 
defamation claim based on the false statement, published in 
the local paper, that he had not completed required training; 
(3) a right of privacy claim alleging that Defendants’ acts 
placed him in a false light; (4) a right of privacy claim 
alleging that Defendants’ acts brought publicity to his private 
life; (5) a retaliation claim based on the refusal to vote for his 
early retirement; and (6) another retaliation claim alleging 
that his suspension was in response to comments he had made 
regarding pension distributions.  The Defendants moved for 
summary judgment on all claims. 
 
On March 7, 2007, the District Court issued an order 
denying in part and granting in part the motion for summary 
                                              
4 The amended complaint initially stated that it was 
councilman Talutto, rather than Verrastro, who stated he 
would not vote to permit Smith’s early retirement.  In 
depositions, however, Smith testified that it was in fact 
Verrastro who made the statement, and the District Court 
allowed Smith to further amend the complaint to name 
Verrastro instead of Talutto.   
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judgment.  The Court denied summary judgment for 
Defendants on Smith’s claim that he was deprived of early 
retirement as retaliation for his filing suit, holding that there 
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the denial 
was in retaliation for Smith’s lawsuit.  The Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all other 
claims, holding that Smith’s retaliation claim based on his 
pension comments failed because the record was devoid of 
any support for the claim; that the due process claim failed 
because Smith’s eight-day paid suspension did not give rise to 
deprivation of either a property or liberty interest; that the 
defamation claim failed because Pennsylvania provides high 
public officials with an absolute immunity from defamation 
suits; and that both privacy claims failed because the 
information which was made public – that Smith had been 
suspended for lacking required training – concerned a public 
safety matter and was, therefore, a matter of public concern.  
The remaining retaliation claim was allowed to proceed to 
trial with only Verrastro and Dunmore as defendants. 
 
On October 24, 2007, before trial commenced, 
Defendants made Smith a settlement offer of $1000 and early 
retirement.  Smith declined the offer and trial began on 
October 29, 2007.  At the close of Smith’s case, the Court 
granted judgment as a matter of law to Defendants on the 
claim against Verrastro and on the claim for punitive 
damages.  While the Court acknowledged evidence that the 
Dunmore Borough Council’s refusal to vote on the pension 
board’s recommendation for Smith’s retirement could be 
retaliation for Smith’s lawsuit,5 the Court explained that the 
                                              
5 In addition to Verrastro’s threat, deposition testimony 
disclosed alleged statements by Loftus and Councilmen Hart 
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Council was the decision maker and that Verrastro could not 
be individually liable for the Council’s decision not to bring 
the recommendation to a vote.  Likewise, Verrastro’s 
individual threat to vote against Smith’s early retirement 
could not constitute adverse employment action when no vote 
was ever taken.  The Court also held that there was no 
evidence of evil, malicious, or reckless conduct that would 
justify punitive damages.  On October 31, 2007, the 
retaliation claim against the lone remaining Defendant, 
Dunmore, was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict 
in favor of Smith and awarded nominal damages of $1.  After 
trial, pursuant to Smith’s motion for equitable relief, the 
District Court ordered Dunmore to grant Smith early 
retirement.   
 
On November 8, 2007, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§1988(b), Smith filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs.  
Smith sought payment for attorney time of 404.8 hours at 
$300 per hour.  The District Court found both numbers to be 
unreasonable, and reduced the hours to 268.9 and the hourly 
rate to $215.00, arriving at a total amount of $57,831.50 for 
attorney’s fees.  To that, the Court added additional amounts 
for legal assistant fees and fees associated with the fee action 
itself and arrived at a total lodestar amount of $72,261.  
Relying on Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-36 
(1983), which instructs that district courts may need “to 
adjust the fee upward or downward” based on considerations 
                                                                                                     
and Cummings stating that Smith would be denied early 
retirement because of his lawsuit.  There was also evidence 
that the Borough would have saved money by allowing Smith 
to retire early.     
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such as “the degree of success obtained,” the District Court 
further reduced Smith’s requested fees because Smith 
succeeded on only one of his six initial claims and ultimately 
obtained only $1 and early retirement – less than the $1000 
and early retirement offered in settlement.  Consequently, the 
Court reduced the award from the lodestar amount of $72,261 
to $20,000.  The Court also awarded $2,728.16 in total costs.  




 On appeal Smith argues that the District Court erred by 
granting judgment in favor of Defendants on his due process, 
defamation, privacy, and punitive damages claims, and he 
asks that each be remanded for trial.  Smith also argues that 
the District Court erred by reducing his attorney’s hourly rate 
to $215 and reducing the lodestar amount by more than 70 
percent, and he asks us to award attorney’s fees without those 
reductions.  We will address each of Smith’s arguments in 
turn. 
 
 A. The District Court’s Grant of Summary 
  Judgment 
 
 We review a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment under a plenary standard, applying “the same test 
employed by the District Court.”  Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 
412 F.3d 463, 466 (3d Cir. 2005).  The non-moving party “is 
                                              
6 The District Court had jurisdiction over Smith’s 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a), and we 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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entitled to every favorable inference that can be drawn from 
the record,” and we will affirm only if there is no genuine 
issue for trial.  Id. (citing Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 
833 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 
(1) Smith’s Due Process Claims 
 
 The District Court granted summary judgment on 
Smith’s due process claims because the Court found that an 
eight-day paid suspension did not qualify either as 
deprivation of a property interest or as the “plus” prong of the 
“stigma-plus” test for establishing deprivation of a liberty 
interest in reputation.  See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 
F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]o make out a due process 
claim for deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation, a 
plaintiff must show a stigma to his reputation plus deprivation 
of some additional right or interest.” (emphasis in original)).  
Because Smith had not established the required “plus” prong 
of the “stigma-plus” test, the Court declined to consider 
whether the “stigma” prong had been satisfied. 
 
Smith argues that the Court’s conclusions were in error 
and that remand is mandated by our decision in Dee v. 
Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2008).  In Dee, 
we reviewed the due process claims of Robert Dee, another 
Dunmore firefighter who had been suspended along with 
Smith as a result of the same assertion that he had not 
completed required Fire Academy training.  Id. at 228.  Dee’s 
due process claims had been disposed of on summary 
judgment for the same reasons Smith’s had.  Id.  On appeal, 
we held that, because both 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 46190 and 
the CBA allowed firefighters to be suspended only “for 
cause,” Dee had a property interest in not being suspended 
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without cause.  Id. at 230-32.  Dunmore had argued, however, 
that its interest in ensuring that the Borough’s firefighters 
were qualified was a public-safety interest that justified an 
eight-day paid suspension prior to any hearing.  Id. at 233.  
We acknowledged that under Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319 (1976), a strong government interest can justify the pre-
hearing deprivation of a property right, but found that there 
were “issues of disputed fact regarding the Borough’s 
justification for suspending Dee without first affording him 
notice and a hearing.”  Dee, 549 F.3d at 233.  Particularly, we 
noted that Dee had been a fireman for eighteen years, during 
which time he had been promoted numerous times by the 
Borough Council, and that Councilman Talutto stated that the 
Council acted so quickly because they “d[id]n’t want to get 
blasted in the press.”  Id.  We viewed those facts as 
undercutting Dunmore’s argument that the pre-hearing 
suspension was based on concerns over public safety and, 
consequently, we remanded for consideration of the 
Borough’s motives for the pre-hearing suspension.  Id.  Then, 
based on our holding that Dee had a property interest in not 
being suspended, we also concluded that Dee had satisfied the 
“plus” prong of the “stigma-plus” test, and remanded the 
liberty interest claim for consideration of the “stigma” prong.  
Id. at 233-235. 
 
The facts here are indistinguishable from the facts in 
Dee:  Both Dee and Smith were suspended at the same time 
under precisely the same circumstances; the same statute and 
CBA apply, mandating that Smith can be suspended only “for 
cause”; Talutto’s deposition testimony in both cases suggests 
that press coverage, rather than public safety, may have 
motivated the suspension; and, like Dee, Smith had been a 
firefighter for almost eighteen years and had been promoted 
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numerous times by the Borough Council.  Thus, we are 
compelled to follow our precedent in Dee and hold that “there 
exist issues of disputed fact regarding the Borough’s 
justification for suspending [Smith] without first affording 
him notice and a hearing.”  Id. at 233. 
 
We emphasize, however, that we are not suggesting 
that concerns over public safety cannot justify a paid eight-
day pre-hearing suspension.  To the contrary, we recognize 
that the strong government interest in public safety would 
almost certainly justify the comparatively minor deprivation 
inherent in an eight-day paid suspension.  Instead, we 
conclude only that Dee requires us to say that there are 
legitimate factual questions as to whether public safety 
concerns were, in fact, what motivated the Borough Council.  
Accordingly, because genuine issues of material fact remain, 
we will remand Smith’s due process claims to the District 
Court. 
 
(2) Smith’s Defamation Claim 
 
Although the District Court found that Smith had made 
a prima facie case for defamation, it nonetheless granted 
summary judgment on the claim because Pennsylvania grants 
absolute immunity from defamation suits to high public 
officials, including borough council members.  Smith argues 
that the grant of summary judgment to the Dunmore Borough 
Council members was improper because the disclosure of 
Loftus’s letter to the newspaper fell outside the scope of their 





Pennsylvania “‘exempts a high public official from all 
civil suits for damages arising out of false defamatory 
statements and even from statements or actions motivated by 
malice, provided the statements are made or the actions are 
taken in the course of the official’s duties or powers.’”7  
Lindner v. Mollan, 677 A.2d 1194, 1995 (Pa. 1996) (quoting 
Matson v. Margiotti, 88 A.2d 892, 895 (Pa. 1952)).  Smith 
argues that, while the letter itself might have been prepared 
within the scope of the Council member’s official duties, “the 
public disclosure of such a letter, which contains, in the 
district court’s words, an ‘untrue communication’ resulting 
from a ‘failure to exercise reasonable care and diligence,’” is 
not within those duties.  (Appellant’s Brief at 18-19.)  That 
argument takes too narrow a view of the immunity.  The fact 
that a statement is untrue cannot be a basis for exempting it 
from an immunity for defamation, as such an exception 
would swallow the immunity whole.  Likewise, the fact that 
the untruth may have resulted from a “failure to exercise 
reasonable care and diligence,” – i.e., from negligence – is 
immaterial to the invocation of an immunity that is intended 
to encompass even maliciously motivated comments.  Thus, 
Smith’s argument that the high public official immunity 
cannot apply under the circumstances of this case draws too 
narrow a boundary and is mistaken.   
 
                                              
7 Borough council members qualify as high public 
officials for purposes of this immunity.  See, e.g., Osiris 
Enters. v. Borough of Whitehall, 877 A.2d 560, 567 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2005) (holding that borough council members 
qualify as high public officials); Hall v. Kiger, 795 A.2d 497, 
500 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (same). 
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The proper bounds of the immunity are illustrated by 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision in McKibben v. 
Schmotzer, 700 A.2d 484 (Pa. Super. 1997).  There, a 
borough mayor accused a borough police chief of assaulting 
her and, as a result, she suspended the chief and filed a 
private criminal complaint against him.  Id. at 487.  Following 
the suspension, the mayor issued a news release explaining 
the chief’s suspension and describing the “brutal and 
unprovoked assault” on her.  Id.  Shortly thereafter, a 
preliminary hearing was held on the assault charges and the 
criminal complaint was dismissed.  Id.  Immediately after that 
hearing, the mayor made a statement to reporters accusing the 
chief of lying.  Id.  After the chief prevailed in a defamation 
suit, the Superior Court on appeal held that high public 
official immunity applied to the mayor with respect to the 
news release because the mayor “was empowered to suspend 
[the chief], and her comments in the ‘News Release,’ 
although harsh and, as the jury found, untrue, were ‘closely 
related’ to her duties of supervising the borough police 
force.”  Id. at 491.  By contrast, the Court held that the 
immunity did not apply with respect to her statement that the 
chief was lying because there, the mayor “was no more than a 
private citizen seeking to enforce her private criminal 
complaint.”  Id. at 492 (emphasis in original).  Although not 
binding on us, the reasoning of McKibben persuasively 
illustrates the boundary between those actions that are taken 
in the course of an official’s duties and those that are not. 
 
Here, the disclosure of Loftus’s letter to the newspaper 
is akin to the news release in McKibben.  The information 
disclosed to the local paper regarding the basis for Smith’s 
suspension was “‘closely related’ to [the] duties of 
supervising the borough [fire department].”  Id. at 491.  
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Consequently, the District Court correctly concluded that 
Pennsylvania’s high public official immunity shields the 
Council members from any claim for defamation, and we will 
affirm the Court’s grant of summary judgment. 
 
(3) Smith’s Right of Privacy Claims 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment on 
Smith’s false light claim and his claim for publicity given to 
private life because the Court found that the information 
which was made public – that Smith had allegedly failed to 
complete required training – involves public safety and, 
therefore, is a matter of public concern.  Smith argues that 
this was error because his confidential employment 
information is not a matter of public concern.  He also argues 
that whether the information is of “public concern” is relevant 
only to his publicity claim and is not an element of a false 
light claim.  He is wrong on both points.   
 
First, we have little difficulty concluding, as the 
District Court did, that the qualifications of firefighters are a 
public safety matter and, therefore, a matter of public 
concern.  See Chappel v. Montgomery Cnty. Fire Protection 
Dist., 131 F.3d 564, 578 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that speech 
regarding the need for firefighters to receive improved 
training is a matter of public concern); Beckwith v. City of 
Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(“Few subjects are of more public concern to the average 
citizen than the provision of basic fire and rescue services.”).  
The information’s existence in a personnel file does not affect 
the public’s interest in it, and we do not accept the premise 
that employment information is not of public concern when it 
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pertains to a firefighter’s qualifications to be employed in the 
first place.   
 
Second, Smith’s claim that the public’s interest in the 
information is not relevant to his false light claim has no 
grounding in Pennsylvania law, a fact demonstrated 
elsewhere in his own brief by his citation of Strickland v. 
Univ. of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979 (Pa. Super. 1997), for the 
elements of a false light claim: “(1) publicity, (2) given to 
private facts, (3) which could be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person, and (4) which are not of legitimate 
concern to the public.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 20 (citing 
Strickland, 700 A.2d at 987.)); see also Rush v. Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc., 732 A.2d 648, 654 (Pa. Super. 1999) 
(listing “not of legitimate concern to the public” as an 
element of a false light claim).  Because both of Smith’s 
privacy claims require that the information not be of public 
concern and because there is no genuine dispute as to the 
public’s interest in firefighter qualifications, Smith’s privacy 
claims must fail as a matter of law.  We will thus affirm the 
District Court’s summary judgment on those claims. 
 
B. The District Court’s Judgment as a Matter of 
Law on Smith’s Claim for Punitive Damages 
 
“We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
decision to grant judgment as a matter of law” and affirm 
“only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and 
reasonable inference, a verdict in favor of the nonmovant 
cannot be supported by legally sufficient evidence.”  Toledo 
Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 
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204, 209 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 
Smith argues that the District Court erred by granting 
judgment as a matter of law on Smith’s punitive damages 
claim against Verrastro because the record established that 
Verrastro intentionally disregarded Smith’s federally 
protected rights.  Smith has not appealed the judgment in 
favor of Verrastro himself, however.  Even if we read Smith’s 
appeal on punitive damages as implicitly appealing the 
judgment in favor of Verrastro, Smith has made no argument 
on that point and we find no fault in the District Court’s 
conclusion that Verrastro cannot be individually liable for the 
Council’s decision not to vote on Smith’s retirement.  
Consequently, because Dunmore remains the only defendant 
for the retaliation claim, and because “a municipality is 
immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” 
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 
(1981), there is no proper defendant from which Smith can 
claim punitive damages.  Accordingly, we need not consider 
Smith’s argument that Verrastro intentionally disregarded 
Smith’s rights, and we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment as a matter of law. 
 
  C. The District Court’s Denial in Part of Smith’s  
  Motion for Attorney’s Fees 
 
 “We review the reasonableness of an award of 
attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion.”  Washington v. 
Philadelphia Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 




  (1) The Reduction of Smith’s Attorney’s  
   Hourly Rate 
 
The District Court, finding that the requested rate of 
$300 per hour for Smith’s attorney was excessive in light of 
her skill, reputation, and experience, reduced Smith’s 
attorney’s rate to $215 per hour.  The Court supported that 
reduction by adopting its reasoning from Lohman v. Duryea 
Borough, No. 3:05-CV-1423, 2008 WL 2951070 (M.D. Pa. 
July 30, 2008), where it had recently considered a fee petition 
involving the same attorneys and substantially similar issues.  
In Lohman (as well as here), Smith’s attorney supported her 
claimed $300 per hour rate by submitting affidavits from two 
local plaintiffs’ attorneys who charged $300 and $330.  Id. at 
*6-7.  The Court determined, however, that her experience 
and skill were not comparable to those attorneys.  Id.  Instead, 
the Court found her experience to be comparable to one of the 
defense attorneys in Lohman and here, who charged between 
$125 and $170 per hour.  Id. at *7-8.  Based on that 
comparison, the District Court concluded that $215 was a 
reasonable hourly rate for Smith’s attorney.  Id. at *8.  The 
Court adopted that same reasoning to settle on the $215 per 
hour rate in this case.   
 
Smith argues that the reduction was an abuse of 
discretion because the Court inappropriately looked at the 
rates of defense attorneys.  In support of that argument, he 
cites our decision in Washington, where we found a District 
Court’s reduction of an hourly rate to be an abuse of 
discretion because it “focused on the market rates for defense 
attorneys.”  89 F.3d at 1036.  Here, however, the District 
Court did not focus on the market rates for only defense 
attorneys, but looked at the rates for both defense attorneys 
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with similar skill and experience and plaintiffs’ attorneys with 
more skill and experience.  The $215 per hour rate the Court 
then settled on fell between the $170 upper-end rate for a 
similarly experienced defense attorney and the $300 lower-
end rate for the more experienced plaintiffs’ attorneys.  We 
cannot say that was an abuse of discretion.  Consequently, we 
will affirm.8 
 
 (2) The Reduction of the Lodestar Amount 
 
The District Court reduced Smith’s attorney’s fees 
award from the lodestar amount of $72,261 to $20,000 
because Smith had succeeded on only one of his six initial 
claims and ultimately received only $1 and early retirement, 
which was less than the $1000 and early retirement offered in 
settlement.  While Smith objects to the District Court’s 
consideration of settlement negotiations, we held in Lohman 
v. Duryea, 574 F.3d 163, 167-68 (3d Cir. 2009), that 
settlement negotiations can be used to consider the degree of 
success obtained by a party.  Furthermore, the reduction is 
independently justified by Smith’s failure to succeed on five 
of his initial six claims.  The Supreme Court has stated that a 
                                              
8 Smith also seems to suggest that the reduction in his 
female attorney’s rate may have had a discriminatory motive, 
citing a case in which the same district court awarded a male 
attorney an hourly rate in excess of the $215 awarded here 
and stating that “there is no reason why Smith’s lawyer 
should not get the rate that male plaintiff civil rights’ lawyers 
receive.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 35.)  The bald suggestion of 
discrimination is devoid of any support in the record and 
unworthy of further comment. 
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court “should award only that amount of fees that is 
reasonable in relation to the result obtained” and has 
emphasized that there should be no recovery for unsuccessful 
“claim[s] that [are] distinct in all respects from … successful 
claims.”  Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.  Here, Smith prevailed 
only on the claim that he was denied early retirement because 
of the filing of his lawsuit.  His other unsuccessful retaliation 
claim as well as his unsuccessful due process, defamation, 
and privacy right claims were entirely distinct, requiring 
proof only of facts that predated any fact relevant to his 
successful retaliation claim.  Consequently, under Hensley, 
Smith was not entitled to recover fees for those claims, and 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it reduced 
the award to appropriately reflect that limited success.  We 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order to the extent it grants summary judgment on 
Smith’s due process claims and will remand for consideration 
of whether the pre-hearing suspension was supported by an 
interest in public safety and, in addition, for consideration of 
whether Smith has satisfied the “stigma-plus” test, 
establishing deprivation of a liberty interest.  We will affirm 
the order to the extent it grants summary judgment on Smith’s 
defamation and privacy claims, the judgment as a matter of 
                                              
9 Should Smith ultimately prevail on his remanded due 
process claims, he is of course free to make a new motion 





law on Smith’s punitive damages claim, and the partial denial 
of Smith’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. 
